Since the early seventies an increasing attention has been paid to the impact environmental policy has on foreign trade. One of the most important issues is whether count ries with rela tively strict environment al regulat ions tend to experience a deterioration of international competitiveness and thus a fall in the exports, and a rise in the import s, of t he pollut ionintensive commodities or, on the other hand, benefit from the improvement in environmental quality and are likely to develop new comparative advantages in the environmentally more sensitive industries. So far, most empirical studies have concluded that the proportion of environmental costs to the total production costs is still so marginal that environmental policies have hardly any effect on comparative advantage patterns and thus on foreign trade. One of the few exceptions is Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) , who found that stricter regulat ions have some negative impact on bilateral trade flows between OECD countries. The aim of this paper is to show tha t t his outcome is part ly due to model mis-specification. The analysis is based on a triple indexed fixed-effects model and o n its variant s. It is found that, as so on a s both t he impo rting and exp orting country specific effects are taken into consideration, the relationship between stricter regulations and foreign trade becomes sta tist ically insignificant. This suggests that environmental costs do not have a real impact, neither negative nor positive, on foreign trade.
Introduction
Since the early sevent ies policy makers and academics alike, have been paying an increasing attention to the impact environmental policy might have on foreign t rade. One of t he main issues is whether countries with relatively strict environmental regulations tend to experience a deterioration o f internat ional competitiveness and a decline of both local and foreign investment, at least in the pollution-intensive industries. Among ot hers, Anderso n and Blackhurst (1992), Dean (1992) , Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins (1995) , Levinson (1995) , Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1996) and Xing and Kolstad (1996) provide interesting reviews of this issue.
It is a commonly held belief that the pollution-intensive industries of a country which imposes more stringent environmental regulations than its trading partners are likely to suffer a significant increase in production costs. Consequently, these industries either beco me less competitive internationally and lose some of the ir market share or, in order to avo id this loss, they migrate to countries with lower environmental standards. In any case, exports of pollution-intensive commodities of a country with relatively strict environmental regulations decrease, while their imports are expected to increase.
On the ot her hand, fo llowing for example Porter a nd Va n der Linde (19 95) , t his sta tic view can be challenged on t he gro und that a co untry with relat ively stringent environmental regulations can benefit from the improvement in environmental quality and is likely to develop new comparative advantages in the environmentally more sensitive industries. These advantages, in the long run, might more than offset the short-term losses.
Moreover, even in the sho rt run, as Van Beers and Van d en Bergh (1997) po int out, t he negative effect of stringent environmental regulations on export flows and its positive effect on import flows can be blurred by gover nment inter ventions, such as subsidies t o pollutionintensive industries, and import restrict ions on foreign products which do not meet the higher than average domestic environmental standards. In addition to these environmental cost facto rs, industry location will also be driven by ot her eco nomic fundament als such as: access to resources and markets, the supply and quality of labour, and transportation costs, for example. Indeed, the effect of these economic fundamentals may outweigh that of environmental cost factors.
So far empirical studies have not provided strong support for the hypothesis that rela tively high environmental standards lead to the loss of competitiveness, and t o the conseq uent decrease of expo rts and increase of imports. I n fact , ap art from a few exceptions (Walter (1974) and Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) ), most studies on different countries, industr ies and sample periods, conclude that environmental costs relative to total production costs are still marginal and have hardly any effect on comparative advantage patt erns and therefore on foreign trade (see for example, Jaffe et al. (1995) , Low (1992b) , OECD [1985] , Ratnayake (1998) , Stevens (1993) , Sorsa (1994) , Tobey (1990) and Vallaru and Peterson (1997) ).
The stu dy whic h most st rongly motivated this paper is that of Van Beers and Van den Ber gh (199 7). It analyses t he impa ct of enviro nment al regulations on bilateral trade flows for the cro ss se ction o f 21 O ECD count ries in 199 2. I t is based on a gravity model, as developed by Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966) , augmented by variables that measure the strictness of environmental regulations both in the importer and exporter countries. Two strictness measures of environmental regulat ions were used. The first one was based o n the co mbination of seven output -oriented environmental indicators, whilst the second was calculated from only two. Both of these measures, but especially the narrower one, are consistent with the Polluter Pays Principle. The model was estimated over three kinds of bilateral trade flows: total trade; pollution-intensive (or 'dirty') trade; and pollutionintensive trade related to non-resource based (or 'footloose') sectors. The results, based on the narrow environmental regulations strictness measure, can be summarised as follows (Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 1997, pp.41-42): i.
The analysis of total and 'footloose' trade supports "the hypothesis that a more stringent environmental policy exerts a negative influence on exports". However, environmental standards have no significant effect on 'dir ty' expo rts in ge neral. T his means that the pr esence o f resou rces is a mo re important facto r det ermining competitiveness of pollution-intensive resource based industries than environmental standards.
ii.
Relatively strict environment al regulat ions have neg ative impact on all three types of imports (total, 'dirty' and 'foot loose'). This suggests that co untries imposing more strict environmental regulations on their own producers, probably also erect non-tariff barriers to imports in order to protect domestic industries.
The aim of this paper is to find out how much these outcomes depend on the specification of traditional gravity models, such as the one used by Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) . Fo r this reason, instead of the traditional double indexed cross-sectional appro ach, a three-dimensional panel data framework is employed, which allows for both importing and expo rting country effects, as well as for time (or Business cycle) effects. Even if these additional specific effects are insignificant, the panel data set used is expected to be more reliable and enlightening than a simple cross-sectional data set, since bilateral trade, especially on the lower, two-and three-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) levels, is often prone to strong annual fluctuations. As our analysis shows, as soon as these specific effects are taken into consideration, the relationship between stricter regulat ions and for eign tr ade becomes st atistically insignificant. This suggests that environmental costs do not have a real impact, neither negative nor positive, on foreign trade.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is briefly described in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses the measurements and sources of the data used, with special regard to the strictness of environmental regulations. The empirical findings are summarised in Section 4. Finally, the concluding remarks can be found in Section 5.
The Model
The basic model, hereafter referred to as Model B, is a triple indexed generalisation of the model used by Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) . It has the following form.
( 1) where: ln denot es na tural lo gar ithm; Since countries with large populations tend to be more self-reliant, one might expect $ 3 and $ 4 to be negative. However, the expansion of the scale of productive capacity causes longrun aver age costs to fall, giving more po pulo us countr ies a compet itive edg e in exporting, so that $ 4 could also be positive.
DIST ij is a proxy for resistance to trade, thus it is anticipated that $ 5 will be negative. is positive since larger countries tend to possess more natural resources and a bigger exporting capacity.
Finally, SC i and SC j , mea sur e ho w st rict the environmenta l reg ulations are in the importer and exporter countries. In line with the assumption that strict environmental standards lead to relatively lower exports but higher imports, one might expect $ 12 to be positive and $ 13 to be negative. However, as mentioned earlier, $ 12 could be negative, either due to subs idizatio n of lo cal produc tio n suffe ring from the higher than average domest ic environmental standards, or as a result of trade barriers imposed to imports from countries with lower environmental standards. Similarly, $ 13 could be positive for countries which have a comparative advantage in the environmentally more sensitive ind ust ries. I n summary, it is hypothesized that the $ 1 , $ 2 , $ 6 , $ 7 , $ 8 , $ 9 slope parameters are positive, $ 3 , $ 5 , $ 10 are negative, while t he signs of $ 4 , $ 11 , $ 12 and $ 13 are ambiguous.
The cross sectional specification used by Van Beers and Van den Bergh (19 97) is a special case of (1), with T = 1. It is denoted as Model A. 1 Apart from Models A and B, which do not t ake any specific effects into consideration, three further generalisations of (1) are also considered. The first one, Model C, allows fo r import er country effects by including
This ext ra term represent s all the fact ors t hat might have some influence on imports, but are not explic itly taken into consideration in (1), and it permits average propensities to import to differ across countries. The second one, Model D, ad ditionally allows for exporter co untry effects. Therefore, it has two extra terms, " i for the importer country effect and ( j for the exporter country effect. Finally, the third one, Model E, has three extra terms, " i , ( j and 8 t , with the last one ser ving to capture any time (business cycle) effects on bilateral trade flows.
In matrix form the most general specification (Model E) can be written as , (2) where: y is the vector of observations of the dependent variable, ;
Z is the matrix of observat ions of t he explanat ory variables in (1), including the constant term, organised in a similar way to y; 
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Imposing the 8 t = 0 oe t restrictions on (2) 
while in Model B all three vectors are assumed to be null vectors.
In Models C-E, the " i , ( j and 8 t specific effects can be treated in two different ways, either as rando m variables (a n err or components a pproac h) or fixed parameters (a fixed effects approach). Given that a specific aim is to analyse these effects, they are treated as fixed unknown parameters. Note, however, that similarly to these fixed specific effects, some of the independent variables are one dimensional, that is they vary across countries, but not over time. As a result, Models C-E cannot be estimated without appropriate restrictions. In Model C LAND i would be perfect ly collinear with " i , so it has to be dropped from the specification. Similarly, Models D and E have to be estimated without LAND i and LAND j . The other independent variables change in at least two dimensions, so they do not cause per fect mult icollinearit y. The ij-indexed DIST and ADJ variables, for examp le, w ould be perfect ly multicollinear with " i ×( j , but not with " i +( j . Note also that all of the models have a constant term. Therefore, again in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, at least one dummy variable has to be dropped from each set, i.e. there cannot be mor e than N-1 importer country dummies, N-1 exporter country dummies and T-1 year dummies.
The Data
The data utilised in this study is comprised of annual measures for seven years, 1990-1996 Statistics, Statistical Papers, Series D (1990 , 1991 , 1992 , 1993 , 1994 , 1995 . 
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Balances of OECD Countries, 1996 , International Energy Agency, 1999 POP it , POP jt , populations of countries i and j in year t (Source: Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1996 , International Energy Agency, 1999 .
DIST ij , average distance between the major economic areas of countries i and j in nautical miles. It has been calculated fo llowing Linnemann (1966) . The distances between major ports are extracted from http://www.ports.com, the average distances between the ports and the most important economic areas are fr om Linnemann (1966, pp.222-226) .
LAND i , LAND j , land areas of co unt ry i and j in 1,000 ha, obtained from the Human Development Report, 1996, United Nations Development Programme.
SC it , SC jt , mea sur e of the rela tive str ictness of domes tic environmenta l regulations in countries i and j in year t.
Since SC is the mos t cruc ial var iable in the analysis, it warrant s further discussion. Six strictness measures were experimented with. Each one of these was based on one of the following two indicators published in the Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1993 -1994 , International Energy Agency, 1996 and 1999 EC it , t ot al fina l consumpt ion o f energy (Mt oe) in c ountr y i in year t; and ES it , t ot al pr imary energy sup ply (Mtoe) in c ountr y i in year t.
These absolute indicators were compared to GDP1, to GDP2 and to POP, respectively, and from the resulting relative measures, index numbers were calculated for 1990-1996 (1980=100). Then, for each year, the countries were ranked (from the worst to the best), both upon the static and dynamic measures. For each country the two ranks were summed and upon this compound measure t he countries were ranked again. In this way six sets of ranks were o btained for 1990-1996. Finally, these ranks were divided by the number of countries in order to derive six sets of strictness measures ranging between 0 (no environmental regulations) and 1 (strict environmental regulations).
The rankings for 1992 are shown in For this reason, although each model was estimated using all six rankings, attention is focuss ed o n th e re sult s based on t ot al pr imary energy supply and GDP deflated by exchange rates. The correspo nding ranks, R ES, G DP2 , for each year, are illustrated in Figure   1 . Clearly, the relative strict ness of environmental regulat ions changed significantly dur ing the sample period, most notably in Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden 
Estimation Results
Before reviewing the most important outcomes of the analysis, there are t wo remarks t o be made. Firstly, since heterosced asticity is very likely, the usual t-statistics were computed from heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Secondly, some of the bilateral trade flows are zero, for which t he dependent variable, lnIMP, is not defined. In order to circumvent this proble m, all impo rt figures wer e infla ted by unity. 10 In spite of this, due to the fact that ln(IMP+1) might be zero, the OLS estimators are still potentially biased, so 11 There are only 2 censored TIMP observations, 81 censored DIMP observations and 127 FLIMP observations, while the sample size is 3864. 12 For brevity, not all details are reported in this paper, but are available on request. 13 Note that t hese F-tests are strictly evalua ting th e net effect of the additional set of dummies and that of the left out perfectly collinear variable(s).
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Tobit est imato rs w ere also expe riment ed with and all non-po sitive depend ent variable values were censored. However, as the proportion of censor ed observat ions is small, the OLS and Tobit results are very similar, so only the most important OLS results are discussed in t his paper.
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Five models, Models A-E, for three types of bilateral trade flows, using six different environmental regulat ions strictness measures were estimated. 12 The OLS results based on GDP2 and R ES, G DP2 are summarised in Tables 2-4 . Table 2 contains the findings for TIMP, Table 3 for DIMP and Table 4 for FLIMP. In each table the first set of results is from a cross-sectional analysis for 1992, similar to the one performed by Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) , and the other four sets are the estimation results of (2) and its generalisations over the whole sample period. The out comes of various F-tests for the joint significance of the additional dummy variables are also presented in these tables.
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Total Imports
In Models A and B, which do not allow for any specific effects, all slope estimates but two are significant in the expected direction. In particular, both importing and exporting country GDPs, adjacency and EEC or NAFTA membership seem to be positively related to total bilateral import flows. On the other hand, importing and exporting count ry populations and land sizes, as well as the distance between these countries, exert negative impacts on total imports. The EFT A dummy is insignificant in Model A, but it is weakly significant in the unexpected, i.e. negative, direction in Model B. Most importantly, the relative strictness of environmental regulat ions in the importing co unt ry has a st rongly significant negative effect However, as our ana lysis with th e different str ingency measures shows, the a ppar ent effec t of environmental regulations in the exporting country strongly depends on the mea sure used. If, for example, instead of R ES,G DP2 we use R EC,G DP1 , then lnSC jt seems to exert a sign ifican t posit ive effect on lnTIMP ijt , while using R ES,POP or R EC,POP the effect is insignificant in Model A, but significantly negative in Model B.
15 There is only one type of stringen cy measures which leads to a different outcome: using R EC,G DP2 strictness in th e importi ng countr y has a sign ificant negative effect on t otal bi later al tr ade in all fi ve specifications. Apart from this important difference, the estimation results are very similar. a) ***, ** and * i ndicate significance at the 1 %, 5% or 10% level, r espectively, while (?) shows that the slope estimate is significant in a perverse direction. b) D i , D j and D t denot e the s ets of insign ificant (a t the 10% level) import er countr y, exporter country and time dummy variables. The countries are numbered as: 1, Australia; 2, Austria; 3, Belgium-Luxemburg; 4, Canada; 5, Denmar k; 6, Finland; 7, Fran ce; 8, Germany; 9, Greece; 10, Iceland; 11, Ireland; 12, Italy; 13, Japan; 14, Mexico; 15, the Netherlands; 16, New Zealand; 17, Norway; 18, Portugal; 19, Spain; 20, Sweden; 21, Switzerland; 22, Turkey; 23 , the United Kingdom; 24, the USA. c) Due to the differen t sample si zes the first adjusted R 2 value is not comp arable with the other four.
on tot al bilateral import flows, while the regulat ions in the exporting country seem to be uninfluent ial. This is in sharp contrast with the findings of Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) who detected significant negative relat ionships bet ween total bilateral imports and the strictness of environmental regulations in both the importing and exporting countries.
14 Consider ing the ot her thr ee specificat ions, t hree no table important differences in t he results are apparent. Firstly, as bo th the import ing and exporting country effects are taken into consideration, the exporting count ry population lose s its significance. Secondly, the EFTA dummy becomes significant in the expected direct ion. Thirdly, both stringency measures turn out to be insignificant, suggesting that they have no real impact on bilateral trade. It is also clear from t he ge neral F-tests that both the importing co unt ry du mmy variables and the exporting country dummy variables are jointly significant. These results suggest that Models A and B are incorrectly specified. In those models t he omit ted specific effects might be assumed by the ot her indep ende nt varia bles, most not ably by lnPOP jt and lnSC it , making them appear significant.
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Judging the quality of these models by the adjusted coefficient of det ermina tio n, all 16 By and large t his outcome is n ot sensitive to th e choice of the stri ctness measur e. 17 However, as our results suggest, this migh t be due to the cross-sectional natur e of their analysis. In Model A, using R ES,POP or R EC,POP no significant relationship between lnDIMP ijt and lnSC it or lnSC jt can be detected, but in Model B the first relat ionship is sign ificantly negative and t he second is signi ficantly positive. Table 3 . They suggest that not allowing for specific effects, i.e. Models A and B, importing and exporting country GDPs have positive effects, while p opulat ions, land sizes and dis tance all exert negative imp act s on 'dirt y' imports. As for the relative stringency of environmental regulations, strictness in the importing country has a strongly significant negative influence on 'dirty' trade, while strictness in the exp orting count ry seems t o be positively rela ted to it . No te, t hat in this respect there is an important difference between the total and 'dirty' trade flows. In these models total imports seemed to be unaffected by environmental regulat ions in the exporting count ry, but 'dirty' imp orts a re p osit ively related to them. It also indicates that importing countries prefer to purchase from countries with high enviro nment al st anda rds . This ag ain contr adicts Van Bee rs and Va n den Ber gh (199 7) w ho fo und no significa nt r elat ionship between 'dirty' imports and the strictness of environmental regulations in the exporting countries.
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In Model A adjacency, EEC and EFTA memberships are insignificant , whilst in Firs tly, the land size of the importing count ry ha s a signific ant negative effect o n 'dirt y' imports, but it seems to be insignificant in relation to 'footloose' imports. This might be due to the fact that natural resources play a much more important role in the competitiveness of the 'dirty' sectors in general than in the competitiveness of the 'footloose' industries. Although the app licat ion o f the differ ent measure s led to some what different estimation results, it is clear from this study that the impact of environmental policy on foreign trade cannot be assessed properly without the importing and exporting country effects. Without these specific effects there seems to be a relationship between stricter regulat ions and foreign trade, but its significance fades as soon as both t he import ing and expor ting country specific effects are t aken into consideration. Moreover, F-tests suggest that these effects are jointly significant, that is they are important explanatory variables. This implies that a simple cross-sectio nal or naive panel-dat a model is mis-specified and the stringency measures, and probably also the other quantitative explanatory variables, absorb the influence of the missing specific effects.
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